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Access to Public Utility Billing Envelopes:
The Changing Fortunes of Consumer Representation
in PUC Proceedings
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INTRODUCTION
In the ten-year period from 1973 to
1983, San Diego Gas and Electric Company's (SDG&E) residential rates increased over 400%. I OPEC's control
over oil prices and the increasing costs
of cultivating alternative sources of
energy may partially explain the increase. Yet, around the nation, people
began to question whether state regulatory authorities, despite their public
interest mandates, might be rubber-stamping utility rate increase requests. 2 Could

this be the reason for SDG&E's drastic
rate increase?
To suggest that the California Public
Utilities Commission (PUC) actually
rubber-stamps SDG&E's utility rate increase requests is an oversimplification.
Rate hearings are anything but simple.
Often, reams of documents and months
of hearings must be synthesized before
the PUC reaches any decision.
Nevertheless, the PUC itself recognizes that its decisionmaking process
has shortcomings. 3 For instance, the
PUC must base its decisions on information which tends to be biased toward
utilities rather than ratepayers. Utilities
generally have extensive legal and technical representation in PUC matters,
while ratepayers are unorganized and
underrepresented. The Commission created a Division of Ratepayer Advocates
(DRA) to help represent the ratepayer
perspective.4 But, according to the California Supreme Court, with whom the
PUC agrees, the effectiveness of the
DRA is limited: "the staff is subject to
institutional pressures that can create
conflicts of interest; and it is circumscribed by significant statutory limitations such as lack of standing to seek
either rehearing... or judicial review... of
Commission decisions." 5 Because of
these limits on the DRA, participation
by organized consumer groups is essen* The author is a 1988 graduate of
the University of San Diego School of
Law and aformer intern at the school's
Centerfor Public Interest Law.
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tial if ratepayer interests are to be
properly
represented in PUC proceed6
ings.
But the expertise and preparation
required for meaningful participation in
PUC proceedings is costly, and consumer groups often face severe budgetary constraints. Even so, after a decade
of rate increases, SDG&E residential
ratepayers were encouraged when, in
1983, the PUC approved a proposal
which enabled the creation of Utility
Consumers' Action Network (UCAN)a consumer group that would represent
7
the interests of SDG&E ratepayers.
The PUC gave UCAN limited access to
SDG&E's billing envelopes for the purpose of communicating to consumers
and soliciting funds to elect a board of
directors from the ratepayer community
and finance legal representation for
ratepayers in PUC proceedings.8 With
this advantage, UCAN got off to a fast
start. 9
However, three years after the creation of UCAN, the U.S. Supreme
Court disallowed consumer group access
to utilities' billing envelopes in Pacific
Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) v.
CaliforniaPublic Utilities Commission.10
Accordingly, the PUC has stopped allowing UCAN and other consumer groups
to use utility billing envelopes, and is
now experimenting with a much more
conservative insert plan." Anticipating
the PUC's review of its current insert
plan-scheduled for the end of 1988this article analyzes PG&E v.PUC, the
PUC's response to the case, and recommends a comprehensive plan aimed at
promoting greater representation of the
consumer perspective in PUC proceedings.
THE BILLING INSERT IDEA
To address the problem of rising
utility rates in the 1970s, Ralph Nader
and other consumer advocates began to
suggest statewide institutional changes.
Nader "conceived of having state legislatures create independent, self-supporting groups to represent the consumer in
utility issues."'1 2 In 1980, Wisconsin
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formed the first of these citizen utility
Illinois and
boards (CUBs), followed by
3
a handful of other states.'
California took a slightly different
approach. The California legislature rejected the statewide CUB concept. 4
Instead, the PUC adopted the plan that
allowed for the creation of UCAN-a
regional ratepayer advocacy group dedicated to representing consumer interests
in state regulatory proceedings involving
a single utility.' 5
The California approach and the
CUBs in other states had important.
common characteristics: both approaches authorized consumer group access to
utilities' billing envelopes, so that consumer groups could more easily communicate to consumers and solicit funds.
Allowing access to billing envelopes
seemed to make sense. Only use of excess
space in the envelopes was authorized,
so utilities
incurred no additional
costs. 16 Moreover, the PUC had found
on several occasions that the extra space
belongs to the ratepayers, "since the
cost of envelopes and postage is included in the development of the utility's
revenue requirement."1 7 Thus, according
to the PUC, equity suggests that the
extra space should be used to consumers'
benefit.' 8
The PUC found the UCAN proposal
to be a particularly appealing way of
using excess space in utility billing envelopes because democratic principles
are central to UCAN's structure.' 9
UCAN's corporate board of directors is
elected by voting members. At the time
UCAN was created, the only membership requirements were (1) status as an
SDG&E residential or small business
ratepayer; (2) a yearly contribution of
$4; and (3) a member must be at least
sixteen years of age. The PUC determined that these democratic principles
would likely "benefit the greatest number
of ratepayers and not just certain individuals or interest groups. The best way
this society has devised for arriving at
such a result is the democratic election
process." 20
SDG&E decided against challenging
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UCAN's access to its billing envelopes
in the courts. Thus, for the time being,
UCAN flourished.
PG&E v. PUC
In 1980, a northern California consumer group-Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN)-intervened in a
PG&E ratemaking proceeding before the
PUC. TURN urged the PUC to forbid
PG&E from including Progress in its
monthly billing envelopes to ratepayers. 2' Progress, a newsletter containing
information ranging from political editorials to tips on energy conservation,
had been published regularly by PG&E
for 62 years. 22 The PUC declined to
order a stop to Progress' distribution.
Instead, it determined that Progress
occupied excess space in the billing envelopes and that this excess space belonged to ratepayers. So, in 1983, in an
effort to apportion the extra space between PG&E and its customers, the
PUC granted TURN limited access to
PG&E's billing envelopes four times per
year for two years-just as it had done
previously
in the plan that created
2a
UCAN.
In granting TURN access to PG&E
billing envelopes, the PUC apparently
abandoned its preference for democratically operated consumer groups. TURN
lacked the democratic safeguards that
were built into UCAN; instead of membership election of the group's directors,
TURN's Executive Director, Sylvia Siegel, personally
selected its board of
24
directors.
Unlike SDG&E's response to the
PUC's order regarding UCAN, PG&E
responded to the order granting TURN
access to billing envelopes by appealing
to the California Supreme Court, primarily on first and fifth amendment
grounds. 25 After the California court
denied discretionary review, PG&E took
its appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Court noted probable jurisdiction
and accepted the case for review on the
merits. 26
In a 5-3 plurality decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court vacated the order of the
PUC and remanded the case to the California Supreme Court. Justice Powell
stated the question of the case for the
four-member plurality as follows:
"whether the California Public Utilities
Commission may require a privately
owned utility company to include in its
billing envelopes speech of a third
party
27
with which the utility disagrees."
In reversing the PUC, the plurality
drew analogy to the precedent of Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.28 In
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that case, the Court struck down a
Florida right-to-reply statute which enabled political candidates to respond
when their characters or records had
been assailed in newspaper articles. Like
the Florida right-to-reply statute, the
plurality reasoned, the PUC's order imposed a content-based penalty on
PG&E's speech. 29 Since the order only
allowed access to those who disagreed
with PG&E's speech, PG&E would be
less likely to speak out for fear of the
inevitable rebuttal. The likely result,
according to the plurality: a reduction
flow of information to the
in the overall
30
consumer.
The plurality also determined that,
as would be true if the Miami Herald
were required to print a candidate's
response, the PUC's order would force
PG&E to be associated with speech with
which it disagrees. 3' The plurality found
that the PUC's order, rather than limiting TURN to explaining its program
and soliciting donations, "leaves TURN
to use the billing envelopes to discuss
any issues it chooses. Should TURN
choose, for example, to urge [PG&E's]
customers to vote for a particular slate
of legislative candidates, or to argue in
favor of legislation that could seriously
affect the utility business, [PG&E] may
with
be forced either to appear to 3agree
2
TURN's views or to respond.
The plurality also relied on Wooley
v. Maynard.33 In that case, the Court
ruled that New Hampshire could not
require citizens to display the slogan
"Live Free or Die" on their license
plates. Even though the license plates
belonged to the state, the citizens'
vehicles actually distributed the New
Hampshire slogan. Similarly the plurality did not deny that the excess space in
the bill envelopes belonged to ratepayers, but disposed of the PUC's equity
argument by stating that even if the
extra space in the billing envelopes
belonged to the ratepayers, the PUC's
order improperly required PG&E to use
its envelopes and 34workers to distribute
TURN's message.
The plurality distinguished PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.35 In

that case, the Court held that a shopping
center owner could not deny access to a
group of students who wished to hand
out pamphlets in a "peculiarly public"
area of the shopping center. 36 The plurality decided that the PUC's order negatively impacted PG&E's exercise of its right
to speak because it would impermissibly
force PG&E to speak when it may prefer
to refrain from speaking; but allowing
access in Prune Yard had no similar

impact on the shopping center owner. 37
In PruneYard, the shopping center
owner apparently did not allege that he
objected to the content of the pamphlets
or that his own expression was hindered;
the access right was not content-based;
and the owner's business was already
open to public access.
After determining that PG&E's constitutionally protected speech had been
burdened, the plurality then applied
traditional first amendment standards
to determine whether the PUC order
was a narrowly tailored means of serving
a compelling state interest.38 The PUC
asserted two compelling state interests
for its order: its desire for needed consumer input for effective ratemaking
proceedings, and the need to broaden
the spectrum of information available to
consumers. According to the plurality,
both of these asserted state interests
could be39 served by less restrictive alternatives.
In summary, the plurality ruled that
the PUC's order authorizing access to
PG&E's billing envelopes by a third
party violated the utility's first amendment rights. PG&E v. PUC may be
interpreted as extending "negative free
speech" rights to corporations. Apparently, like individuals and newspapers,
publicly regulated monopoly corporations now have a right to refrain from
speaking.
However, two limits to such a broad
statement are found within the decision.
First, the plurality's footnote 12 distinguishes the PUC's order allowing
access to TURN from those orders requiring utilities to carry various legal
notices in their billing envelopes:
The Commission's order is thus
readily distinguishable from orders
requiring appellant to carry various legal notices, such as notices
of upcoming Commission proceedings or of changes in the way
rates are calculated. The State, of
course, has substantial leeway in
determining appropriate information disclosure requirements for
business corporations/ °
Second, Justice Marshall, in concurrence, was unwilling to say that corporations have speech rights which are
4
coextensive with those of individuals. '
At most, only four justices went that far.
CRITICISM
The dissenting opinions are logical
points for beginning an examination of
the shortcomings of the plurality's opinion. Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Stevens both filed dissents.
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Justice Rehnquist, while apparently
satisfied with the plurality's statement of
the issue in the case, disagreed with its
analysis. He said that because a candidate's right to reply in Tornillo depended on the newspaper's own adverse
42
speech, it was a content-based penalty.
However, the right of access granted to
TURN was not conditioned upon
PG&E's speech. TURN was given access
to PG&E's envelopes four times per
year, no matter what PG&E said.
TURN's access was not a penalty for
adverse PG&E speech. 43 Moreover, Rehnquist suggested that allowing a right of
access to TURN would not hinder
PG&E's speech. Unless TURN is a purely reactive organization-and unlikely
to address controversial topics without
prompting from PG&E-PG&E would
not be induced to temper its own speech."4
Further, Rehnquist complained about
the plurality's first amendment "negative
free speech" analysis on two grounds.
First, he cited the Prune Yard case,
which held that an effective disclaimer
was sufficient to eliminate infringement
of one's right not to speak. According
to Rehnquist, nothing in the record suggested that the PUC-mandated disclaimer on TURN's inserts was not sufficient
to protect PG&E from being associated
with TURN's speech. 45 Second, he emphasized that natural persons have negative free speech rights because of their
interest in self-expression. Extension of
individual freedom of conscience cases
(such as Wooley) to corporations strains
the rationale of those cases. Corporate
free speech rights do not arise because
corporations have any interest in selfexpression. Such rights are recognized
as a means of furthering the first amendment purpose of fostering a broad forum
of information to facilitate self-government. The PUC's order allowing TURN
access to PG&E's billing envelopes
would be consistent with such a policy;
allowing corporations negative free
speech rights has no basis
in policy,
46
according to Rehnquist.
Justice Stevens' dissent took a somewhat different approach. He viewed the
facts and the issue in the case much
more narrowly than did the plurality,
and framed the issue as whether a state
public utility commission may require a
fundraising solicitation by consumer
groups to be carried out through utility
bill envelopes. 47 Stevens quoted the
PUC's actual order, which granted
TURN's petition to include inserts "for
the purpose of soliciting funds to be
used for residential ratepayer representation in proceedings of [the PUC]
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involving PG&E."48 Because the PUC
to including an
explanation of its program, a list of
upcoming PUC proceedings likely to
affect PG&E ratepayers, and a solicitation for voluntary donations, 49 Justice
Stevens doubted whether the "propagandizing and sloganeering" and "freewheeling political debate" feared by the
plurality was even authorized by the
50
PUC's order.
Thus, Stevens saw little difference
between the inserts of TURN and those
legal notices which the plurality would
apparently permit to be included in
utility billing envelopes. 51 Also, Stevens
viewed the PUC-authorized access to
utility billing envelopes as analogous to
the Securities and Exchange Commission's requirement, which is apparently
constitutional, that incumbent directors
transmit 2 proposals of minority share5
holders.
For the most part, the few commentators who have addressed the Court's
treatment of PG&E v. PUC have
echoed and expanded upon the themes
in the dissents-particularly the flawed
first amendment analysis. One commentator, Mitchell Tilner, has argued in
favor of applying the "rational basis"
standard to the PUC's order rather than
the stricter "compelling state interest"
standard because, as Justice Rehnquist
suggested, the plurality failed to explain
how the regulation would result in a
53
direct suppression of PG&E's speech.
While the PUC order may compel PG&E
to speak, it would not seem to pose any
risk of suppression or self-censorship.
The compulsion should be upheld if it
"rationally relates to any legitimate end
of government." Had the plurality applied such a test, the result may well
have been to uphold the PUC's order.
In addition, Tilner points out two
other situations where government has
compelled a corporation to publish
speech it would probably prefer not to
publish, and where federal law is in
apparent conflict with the plurality's
decision. Cigarette manufacturers, for
example, must include on their product's
package a statement containing objectionable statements of a third partythe U.S. Surgeon General. 54 Also, Congress has authorized cable franchise
authorities to require cable television
operators to allocate channel capacity
for public education or governmental
use. 55
Another commentator, although unwilling to go quite as far as Justice
Rehnquist and reject the notion of corporate "negative free speech" rights,
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would uphold the PUC's order because
of PG&E's monopoly status-an issue
avoided by the plurality.5 6 A natural
monopoly provides services most efficiently when it is the only supplier
operating in a market. However, free
from the constraints of competition and
if left unchecked, a monopoly could
take unfair advantage of its captive
market by overpricing. State regulatory
authorities act as a substitute for competition. 57 In theory, the state prevents
oppressive pricing while enabling a monopoly to exist, and thus optimizes economic efficiency through regulation. A
monopoly has made a bargain with
government. In exchange for protection
from competition and a guarantee of a
fair rate of return on its investment, the
monopoly submits to regulation.
Along with the other advantages of
being a sole supplier, a monopoly has
an advantage when it comes to disseminating its views. Not only does it have a
captive audience, but the potential exists
to pass the costs of the monopoly's
communication on to the ratepayer audience. Moreover, because the monopoly
is necessarily the only speaker of its type
in the market, it stands out almost like a
government entity; what the monopoly
says may be taken as authoritative because of its inherently advantageous
position.
Arguably, the threat of monopoly
control over the marketplace of ideas
suggests that limited regulation of monopoly speech may be a good idea. In a
1969 case, Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, the Supreme Court upheld the
FCC's fairness doctrine, which required
television and radio stations to provide
fair coverage of opposing views on public issues and equal time to all qualified
political candidates. 58 Potentially, it
seemed, this case could be used as
precedent justifying regulation of monopoly speech. But the Red Lion decision's potential never materialized. In
fact, the FCC no longer employs the
fairness doctrine as part of its regulatory scheme.5 9
Public utility speech rights were first
discussed by the Supreme Court in ConsolidatedEdison v. Public Service Commission of New York. 60 Fearful of
compromising first amendment principles, the Court refused to expand the
Red Lion decision outside broadcast
situations. The Court held that state
regulatory authorities could not prohibit utilities from using excess space in
billing envelopes to advocate nuclear
power. One commentator, Jeffrey Harrison, has criticized a trend which he
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claims began with Consolidated Edison
and carried over to PG&E v. PUC. The
Burger Court, in its zeal to promote an
agenda of defining first amendment
rights in terms of property ownership,
has not heeded the important distinction
between regulated public6 utilities and
other corporate speakers. '
Finally, one noteworthy point-which
the plurality, dissents, and commentators have missed-is that PG&E v. PUC
is actually a poor test case. 62 TURN
differs from other organizations which
have used the bill insert idea. While
UCAN and the CUBs were created by
state action and modeled on strong
principles of democracy and equity,
TURN is of outside origin, private, and
independent.
The implications of the PG&E v.
PUC decision are disturbing. On the
one hand, the plurality appears to have
broadly construed the facts of the case
and has worded its opinion in sweeping
language. Thus, it could have a drastic
effect on all types of consumer groups
interested in taking part in state regulatory proceedings. Such groups may be
severely limited in their efforts to acquire
adequate funding. Moreover, state regulatory proceedings may suffer as a result
of diminished input from consumer groups.
On the other hand, the shortcomings
of the plurality opinion-and the fact
that it was only a plurality opinionmay eventually diminish its value as
precedent. First, the plurality's first
amendment analysis is suspect, as pointed out in the dissents and commentaries.
Second, the plurality fails to adequately
analyze PG&E's monopoly status and
the related policy considerations. Third,
the private and independent nature of
TURN, compared with other consumer
groups who have been granted access to
billing envelopes, was not addressed by
the Court. Each of these factors suggests
that the legal rule in PG&E v. PUC is
susceptible to a more narrow interpretation.

REACTIONS
CUB Lower Court Challenge
While the legal rule of PG&E v.
PUC may eventually be more narrowly
interpreted, so far it has not happened.
In fact, opportunities to narrow the
scope of the rule have already been
missed by some lower courts.
In CentralIllinois Light Co. v. CUB,
portions of the Illinois statute creating
that state's CUB were challenged in federal court. 63 Specifically, the two portions of the statute which enabled the
CUB to gain access to the utilities' bill-
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ing envelopes came under fire.64 According to the utilities, PG&E v. PUC
applied directly. 65 The district court
agreed. 66 Apparently, the court viewed
the CUB's inserts to be private speech
like TURN's rather than governmental
legal notices, which the Supreme Court
would seemingly authorize. 67 Interestingly, a government co-defendant argued
that the CUB was a government speaker
but the CUB disagreed.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 68 However, it did
not address the issue whether the CUB
was a governmental speaker or a private
speaker. Instead, the court said:
The statutory scheme created
by Section 9 of the Act, in conjunction with Section 10 of the
Act, is in all material respects,
constitutionally indistinguishable
from the PUC order struck down
by the Court in PG&E v. PUC.
In both instances, the government
has selected a speaker on the basis
of its views, and the utilities are
forced to disseminate the views of
that speaker. 69
This case presented an opportunity
to delve into the meaning of "legal
notice." The power to insert legal notices
in utility billing envelopes is an aspect
of government's authority to regulate
monopolies. If a CUB is considered an
arm of government, then its inserts
should be authorized as legal notices,
consistent with government's regulation
of utilities. However, rather than defining "legal notices" so as to include
the CUB's speech (and distinguish it
from TURN's speech), the CentralIllinois Light court viewed the two cases as
indistinguishable.
Thus, instead of narrowing the legal
rule of PG&E v. PUC, the opposite has
occurred. Central Illinois Light has
broadened the prior ruling so that now,
in addition to independent consumer
groups, CUBs can no longer gain access
to utility billing envelopes. 70 The significance of Central Illinois Light Co. v.
CUB as a missed opportunity cannot be
overemphasized.
California's Approach
Following PG&E v. PUC, the California legislature and PUC began reevaluating various methods of encouraging consumer group input on behalf of
the underrepresented in PUC proceedings.
Intervenor Compensation Program.
As noted previously, access to billing
envelopes provided consumer groups
with a productive method of securing

funding. However, it should be pointed
out that the PUC has another mechanism through which consumer groups
may be able to obtain funding. In 1983,
the California legislature passed a bill
authorizing the PUC to award reasonable attorneys' fees along with other
participation costs to intervenors who
are in need of financial assistance and
who make a substantial
contribution to
71
PUC proceedings.
Unfortunately, the intervenor compensation program is limited. First, it
provides no funding to intervenors in
the initial stages of their participation.
For consumer groups, this front-end
funding is crucial; without it, they cannot initiate participation. 72 Second, even
if a consumer group is able to participate, there is no guarantee of compensation. Requiring that the intervenor substantially contribute to an order of the
PUC which benefits consumers can be a
disincentive; a financially needy consumer group, uncertain whether its contribution will be deemed "substantial,"
may be forced to refrain from participating. 73 The PUC itself has indicated
that the intervenor compensation program is inadequate: "while we believe
that the opportunities for compensation
for participation in our proceedings help
assure the development of a full and fair
record, we recognize... that such opportunity may seem illusory to an individual
ratepayer."74
The legislature and PUC have recently considered a variety of proposals to
supplement the intervenor compensation
program.
Legal Notice Inserts. Footnote 12 of
the PG&E v. PUC plurality opinion
appears to authorize a variety of legal
notice inserts in utility envelopes.7 5 The
PUC has long required such legal notices
in billing envelopes as part of its regulation of utilities. "Bill insert notices have
been required concerning energy conservation programs, federal income tax
changes, lifeline services for low income
groups, third party designees for elderly
and handicapped customers, telephone
service options, area 76code changes, and
refund entitlements."
Legal notice inserts-now favored by
UCAN, TURN, and other consumer
groups-would encourage the participation of consumer groups in PUC proceedings by directly providing a listing
of such groups in a PUC insert, designating those seeking support, and notifying
ratepayers that they may make inquiries
or contributions to the group(s) of their
choice. Putting the list in the form of a
"consumer advocacy check-off" and pro-
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viding a return envelope have also been
suggested to
make the system easy for
77
ratepayers.
But utilities object to the "consumer
advocacy check-off" type of insert. Interpreting footnote 12 narrowly, utilities
argue that a "consumer advocacy checkoff" insert would be unconstitutional for
the same reasons as the TURN billing
insert discussed in PG&E v. PUC; utilities would be forced to carry messages
with which they disagree, and would be
discriminated against in favor of con78
sumer groups on the basis of content.
Utilities also contend that the footnote
12 exception applies only to notices
about time, date, and place of rate hearings, or matters of public health, safety,
and welfare; a "consumer advocacy checkoff" notice-which is arguably broader
than the parameters described in footnote 12-is not authorized by the
79
footnote.
Sale of Excess Space. A proposal
which would clearly benefit consumers
(if properly implemented) would involve
the sale of extra space in utility billing
envelopes to commercial advertisers.
The PUC could auction extra billing
envelope space to the highest reputable
commercial bidder.80 Such use of the
extra space has been employed with
success in other states; in California,
Pacific Bell Telephone Company is experimenting with a program of enclosing
other carriers' bills along with PacBell's
own bills.8 ' The revenue from the sale of
the extra space could be used to lower
utility rates.
A similar proposal would require
utilities to pay for their own use of the
extra space in their envelopes, and the
additional revenue could result in decreased rates. According to the SOR,
"PG&E would at the very least have to
pay fourth class bulk mail rates for
Progress if it did not mail it with the
customer bill. Thus, utility postage savings might be used to establish a fee. Or,
a reasonable shareholder fee might be
set at the amount commercial advertisers
would be willing to pay to secure access
to the extra space utilized for utility
82
inserts."
Both these sale-of-excess-space proposals contain an element of poetic justice. Direct monetary benefit from
commercial advertising through the sale
of excess space is a nice addition to the
economic formula that normally requires
consumers to subsidize the advertising
cost of producers by paying inflated purchase prices. Unfortunately, standing
alone, these sale-of-excess-space proposals do nothing to promote the PUC's

primary objective-increased consumer
group participation in PUC proceedings.
Consumer Group ParticipationFund.
Although the sale-of-excess-space proposals do not automatically promote
ratepayer advocacy in PUC proceedings,
it may be possible to remedy this deficiency. After all, the sale of excess
space in utility billing envelopes would
83
likely bring in substantial revenues.
The legislature or PUC could earmark
these revenues for uses which promote
consumer group input into the PUC.
This participation fund proposal would
enable consumer groups to benefit indirectly from the sale of extra space in
utility billing envelopes.8 4 In these days
of government fiscal responsibility, the
attractiveness of the participation fund
proposal is enhanced because it could
provide more money to consumer groups
than is otherwise available through intervenor compensation, without decreasing
the budgets of other needy government
programs.
Senate Bill 437 (Rosenthal). In the
1987 session of California's legislature,
much of the debate over how best to
achieve sufficient consumer advocacy in
PUC proceedings centered around SB 437.
As amended, this bill called for PUC
implementation of a trial one-year legal
notice insert program. Four times per
year, the PUC Public Advisor's Office
was to prepare legal notices for inclusion
in utility billing envelopes. These notices
would identify upcoming utility ratesetting proceedings likely to have the greatest effect on consumers, and inform
consumers of their right to become intervenors or support a consumer group
which intervenes regularly. The notices
would also explain that consumers could
contact the Public Advisor's Office to
learn more about the various consumer
groups which regularly intervene. SB
437 also directed the PUC to investigate
the feasibility of selling the extra space
in utility billing envelopes for commercial advertising or charging the
utilities for their own use of the extra
space; the PUC was to report its findings
to the legislature in January 1989.
As introduced, SB 437 called for a
"consumer advocacy check-off" insert,
which would have directly identified
regular intervenors requesting financial
assistance, and would have established a
two-year trial period, rather than just
one year. But these measures were removed in amended versions of the bill.
Despite the amendments, the Assembly
defeated SB 437.
The PUC's Current Insert Plan. The
reason for SB 437's defeat in the
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Assembly is easily explained. The PUC
had already begun taking steps to implement a plan substantially similar to
that mandated by the amended version
of the bill. Following PG&E v. PUC,
TURN petitioned the PUC to initiate a
"consumer advocacy check-off" insert in
PG&E billing envelopes. Although the
PUC did not completely reject the billing
insert idea, it denied TURN's petition in
May 1987, and tentatively adopted a
very conservative legal notice proposal
-one which was favored by the utilities,
and very similar to the amended version
of SB 437 (then pending in the legislature). This plan compels utilities to
include in their billing envelopes quarterly legal notice inserts which require interested consumers to contact the PUC's
Public Advisor's Office to obtain a list
of consumer groups
which intervene in
85
PUC proceedings.
One commissioner, Donald Vial, supported the more directly-informative
"consumer advocacy check-off" insert. 86
In his concurring opinion, Commissioner
Vial suggested that the majority had not
chosen "the most effective legally permissible means of promoting ratepayer
participation through intervenors. "87
The PUC will reevaluate its current
legal notice insert plan at the end of
1988.88 The shape of any permanent plan
is most likely to be determined after the
PUC conducts this upcoming re-evaluation. To fully understand how the current legal notice plan has worked so far,
it is necessary to examine how the plan
was implemented. The Public Advisor's
Office has most of the responsibility for
ensuring that the plan is carried out as
intended.8 9 The Public Advisor's Office
writes the legal notices to be inserted in
the utilities' billing envelopes, and determines the list of intervenors which will
be mailed to those consumers who request the list.90 To prepare this list, the
Public Advisor's Office sent letters to
past intervenors notifying them of the
plan and inviting them to apply to be
included on the list. Those interested in
being placed on the list were required to
provide certain information, including
name of organization; address and telephone number; tax status; number of
members; group of ratepayers represented; prior, present, and future involvement of the organization in PUC proceedings; and purpose of the organization. 9'
The PUC authorized the Public Advisor's Office to establish criteria for
determining which consumer groups
could be included on the list. But it also
mandated that the list include as broad
a spectrum of intervenors as possible, so

0
that consumers would be able to best
choose for themselves which group(s) to
contact and/or support.
Several problems have developed regarding the list prepared by the Public
Advisor's Office. First, because the
PUC ordered the list to include a broad
spectrum of intervenors, the Public Advisor's Office performed no screening
whatsoever of the groups which requested inclusion on the list.92 As a result, the
first list of intervenors distributed to
requesting ratepayers included descriptions of several small special interest
groups which do not, have never, and
have no plans to represent the interests
of ratepayers in PUC proceedings. 93
And while some arguably undeserving
groups were included, at least one consumer group which has successfully intervened in several PUC proceedings in
the areas of both telecommunications
and gas/electric utilities was not included
on the list because the Public Advisor's
Office lost its application. 94
Problems also exist concerning the
Public Advisor's distribution of the list.
First, because the list distributions require a mailing separate from the billing
insert mailing, the current legal notice
plan is probably more expensive than a
plan that would simply include the list
of intervenors directly in the billing
insert. Second, the process of distributing the list is extremely slow. In
several instances, it took over three
months from the time an interested consumer sent a letter requesting the list to
the time the list was received from the
Public Advisor's Office. 95
The current legal notice plan requires
patience and persistence on the part of
consumers interested in having organized
consumer groups represent them at PUC
proceedings. Prior to PG&E v. PUC,
bill inserts enabled ratepayers to write
or contribute directly to consumer
groups. Consumers could become involved without too much effort. The
current legal notice plan requires consumers to first write to the Public
Advisor's Office and then, after waiting
six to twelve weeks, write again, this
time directly to a consumer group.
According to Commissioner Vial, the
current legal notice plan makes it too
difficult for interested consumers to "get
involved."96
The extra burden placed on consumers also impacts consumer groups. Prior
to PG&E v. PUC, the bill insert idea
translated into substantial funding for
consumer groups allowed access to utility billing envelopes. UCAN raised close
to $500,000 in its first two years of
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existence. 97 According to UCAN Executive Director Michael Shames, it would
be much more difficult to start such a
consumer group today. 98 Under the
PUC's current legal notice plan, UCAN
receives fewer consumer inquiries and
fewer membership contributions. UCAN
has no choice but to cut back on its
participation in PUC proceedings. 99
Moreover, UCAN's shrinking budget has
forced contemplation of other, less efficient means of funding, such as door-todoor solicitation. m00 Nothing suggests
that what has happened to UCAN is
extraordinary.
The current legal notice plan undoubtedly meets the constitutional requirements set forth in footnote 12 of
PG&E v. PUC, but whether it is a
worthwhile exercise of the PUC's regulatory authority is another question. The
current legal notice plan makes it difficult for ratepayers to contact consumer
groups, resulting in decreased contributions to consumer groups, and diminished consumer group input into PUC
proceedings. In short, the current legal
notice plan does very little to further its
stated purpose: to improve the record in
PUC proceedings.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this article is to advocate a comprehensive insert program
which will best benefit consumers and
withstand constitutional scrutiny. Ideally,
the best use of excess space in utility
billing envelopes would attempt to accommodate PG&E v. PUC (and the
cases following it), be supported by the
same strong principles as the PUC's
original bill insert program, and benefit
consumers more than the current legal
notice plan. These three ideals are maximized in the following recommendations.
Primary Recommendation-Arm of
Government. In Central Illinois Light
Co. v. CUB, the appellate court decided
that a utility's first amendment rights
would be violated if it were required to
include the messages of a CUB in its bill
envelopes. m0' The court passed up an
opportunity to use the legal notice
language in footnote 12 of PG&E v.
PUC to validate the Illinois CUB inserts.
However, in that case uncertainty surrounded the issue of whether the CUB
spoke as a government speaker or as a
private third party. 102 If the statute had
expressed a definite link between the
CUB and state government, then the
issue of the CUB's status would be more
certain. The CUB would be an arm of
government and, arguably, its inserts
would be valid government legal notices.

Similarly, arms of government could
be created by the California legislature,
with the support and cooperation of the
PUC-or by PUC rulemaking under its
existing broad mandate to regulate monopoly utilities. Rather than completely
overhauling the current system by creating a statewide CUB, California's new
arms of government could be modeled
after UCAN, and naturally integrated
with and supervised by the PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocates and Public
Advisor's Office. Such arms of government would separately represent the
consumers of each of California's major
utilities. Periodically throughout the
year, these arms of government would
be given access to utility bill envelopes
to solicit funds and communicate to
those represented.
The arm of government idea has
many of the same advantages as the
original UCAN-type bill insert program.
The key to ensuring adequate input concerning consumer interests in PUC proceedings is front-end funding of the
consumer groups, which represent those
interests.1 03 The arm of government idea,
like the original bill insert plan, would
enable the fund solicitation necessary
for front-end funding. Moreover, the
arm of government idea, because of its
government integration and supervision,
actually provides a better assurance that
consumers will benefit from the organizations' adherence to principles of democracy and equity.
Such a status for bill inserts might
be accomplished by unusual legislative
intervention in formulating a PUC adjunct. However, the PUC could, by
formal rulemaking proceeding, adopt a
formula to create "ratepayer representation vehicles" as arms of government. Such rulemaking is clearly within
its jurisdiction. The rules, if properly
framed, should create such an arm of
government to which the strictures of
PG&E v. PUC would not apply. Where
such rulemaking enhances the quality of
PUC decisionmaking, includes careful
criteria regarding qualification for inclusion (democratic safeguards, open
meetings, prior demonstrated PUC assistance and certification, and PUC review
powers), limits message content, involves
message content approval by the utility
or the PUC, and clearly identifies its
purpose and source, arm of government
status may be achievable.
The courts' anticipated treatment of
such a concept deserves consideration.
After all, the arm of government idea is
similar to the CUB idea, and Central
Illinois Light appears to hold that CUB
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access to utility billing envelopes is
inappropriate.' ° 4 However, the arm of
government idea appears to be within
the parameters drawn by the weak PG&E
v. PUC plurality. A court could, in
addition, extend its analysis to the issues
of monopoly status and PUC-controlled
ratepayer entity structure not developed
in PG&E v. PUC.Hopefully, this extended analysis would lead the court to favorable consideration of some of the factors
that were given unsatisfactory treatment
in the PG&E v. PUC plurality opinion.
If so, access to utility billing envelopes
by arms of government created to represent consumers would be valid as legal
notices. A careful reading of the plurality
opinion, in conjunction with the view of
the concurring and dissenting opinions,
would justify such rulemaking (or legislation) as constitutional.
Alternative Recommendation-Consumer Advocacy Check-Off Insert. After
PG&E v. PUC, only one of the PUC's
commissioners supported the inclusion
of a list of consumer groups along with
the legal notice to be inserted in utility
bill envelopes. 105 Yet such a plan would
be more beneficial for consumers than
the current legal notice plan. Including
a list along with the legal notice regarding upcoming rate proceedings would
enable consumers to communicate directly with consumer groups immediately
after their interest has been stimulated
by the legal notice.
But would inclusion of a list of consumer groups along with legal notice
inserts in utility bill envelopes be constitutional? Commissioner Vial believes
so.1 06 According to Vial, the Supreme
Court's plurality opinion merely disapproves of the unlimited access of third
parties with hostile views to utility billing envelopes. 07 Listing consumer groups'
"names, addresses, telephone numbers,
etc. does not constitute hostile
speech."108 Such an insert would actually
be content-neutral because some consumer groups could be in agreement
with the utilities and still be included on
the list.1 9 Also, the information contained on such a list would be much
more limited than that contained in the
insert considered in PG&E v. PUC."0
Supplemental RecommendationsSale of Excess Space and Participation
Fund. Either of the two recommendations discussed above could be the
foundation for a comprehensive insert
program. But the bill insert idea has the
potential to benefit consumers in a
variety of ways. Neither of the above
recommendations fully maximizes this
potential.
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Both of the above recommendations
require that the excess space in utility
billing envelopes periodically be used to
distribute legal notice inserts. These legal
notices would not be required in every
month's bill. In all likelihood, the legal
notices would be inserted approximately
four times per year. This leaves eight
months in which the valuable excess
space either goes unused or is used freely
by the utility for its own benefit.
The PUC has ruled that the excess
space in utility billing envelopes belongs
to consumers."' Consumers should be
entitled to benefit from their property
throughout the year, rather than for just
the four months when the legal notices
are included in the utility billing envelopes. In the months between legal notice
distributions, consumers could benefit
by a sale of the excess space to commercial advertisers or by charging utilities a
fee for their own use of the excess space.
Ratepayers would certainly be pleased if
the legislature or PUC required the application of revenues from the sale of
excess envelope space toward a utility
rate reduction.
But, instead of reducing rates, the
legislature or PUC might decide that the
revenues from a sale of excess space
could be put to better use by creating a
participation fund. If the arm of government recommendation is adopted, a
portion of these participation fund revenues could be directly set aside for
front-end funding of the arm of government. If the "consumer advocacy checkoff" recommendation is instead adopted,
the participation fund could be put to
a similar use. The legislature or PUC
would need to establish some fair
method of distributing the participation
fund between the various deserving consumer groups.
CONCLUSION
The PUC showed little initiative in
its implementation of the current legal
notice program. The analytical flaws and
apparent loopholes in PG&E v. PUC
have opened the door for state legislators
and regulators to properly create legitimate UCAN-type organizations, whose
creation and structure would be supervised by the regulator (as was UCAN's),
and whose membership and funding
could be accomplished through legal
notice billing inserts sponsored by the
regulator. Hopefully, upon reevaluation
of its present program, the PUC will
reconsider its unique opportunity.
The PUC's courage to experiment
created a democratic ratepayer advocacy
group which 75,000 San Diegans have

Vol. 8, No. 3

(Summer 1988)

joined. Funded by their voluntary contributions, UCAN has been given credit by
the PUC for almost $250 million in
SDG&E rate reductions based on its
advocacy. It has given the PUC itself
credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of
the citizens served by a regulated utility.
And, curiously, it has stimulated public
discussion of utility issues-enhancing
first amendment values.
It is unclear how the plurality found
that a mechanism for message diversity
is in violation of first amendment values.
It is no more clear why the regulator,
whose experiment succeeded beyond
expectations, should abandon it where
it may be salvaged by means not (ironically) as stimulating to public debate.
But even without discussion of controversial or substantive issues in bill
inserts, and even with the controls
described, the arm of government approach should allow for regulatory process enhancement. In a political setting
where utilities are organized for advocacy,
.notices" for contributions allow ratepayers to use the envelopes they pay for
to voluntarily contribute to an entity
providing more balanced advocacy-and
better government.
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